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1. INTRODUCTION, AIM AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
The plight of refugees and asylum seekers and the concomitant significant rise in global 
displacement, continues to dominate our headlines and policy papers and has become a source of 
major concern for international relations scholars and diplomats. Presently 1 in every 122 
humans are either a refugee, an asylum seeker or are internally displaced (UNHCR, 2016). The 
refugee crisis raises pertinent socio-economic, political and security questions for receiving 
countries. Although migration is not a new phenomenon having occurred throughout human 
history, established policies and mechanisms generally appear inadequate to mitigate inflows of 
displaced people. Migration is a politically contentious issue and at borders international norms 
such as human rights regularly flounder (Ribas-Mateos 2011: 51). People choose to migrate for a 
number of reasons, such as better economic opportunities, to escape various insecurities 
including health insecurity, environmental degradation or food scarcity, to flee persecution in 
their home countries or the terrible consequences of war. The overarching goal for most, if not all 
migrants, is the attainment of individual security. The panoptic provision of individual security 
falls under the human security parasol, which proposes a holistic approach to virtually all threats 
facing all humans 
The focus of human security is the provision of safety nets for vulnerable people. This paper 
seeks to examine the human security paradigm within the context and against the backdrop of 
one of the world’s most vulnerable groups - refugees and asylum seekers. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in the past 5 years, 15 conflicts (8 
of which in Africa) have either been initiated or resumed, causing the internal displacement of 
11.4 million people and resulting in 3.7 million refugees. Africa has produced the largest number 
of refugees and internally displaced people globally (UNHCR, 2016). As a result of these socio-
economic and political realities, Southern Africa, more especially South Africa, has emerged as a 
major migration hub attracting many migrants from Central, East and West Africa and even 
further afield, from Bangladesh, China, Eastern Europe and Pakistan (Segatti, 2011:11). Migrants 
chose South Africa for many reasons: South Africa’s transition to democracy has seen a shift 
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from Apartheid to a democracy; stricter European migration controls; commercial farming; the 
mining and hospitality industries and political instability in other parts of Africa (Segatti, 
2011:12). 
South Africa’s economy began to deteriorate during the early 2000’s, culminating in an economic 
recession in 2008. That greatly impacted key economic sectors such as mining, automotive and 
retail causing unemployment, high levels of poverty and heightened inequality (Africa, 
2015:178-9; Segatti, 2011:18). These insecurities accompanied by the State’s failure to 
adequately provide its citizenry with basic services has been one of the root causes of the 
animosity directed at foreigners, which has intermittently led to violent xenophobic attacks 
against the migrant population (Africa, 2015:179). All of these considerations lead inexorably to 
the following question: How has the South African government sought to ensure human 
security for refugees and asylum seekers? 
Following from that main research question, the sub-objectives of this paper include:  
● Assessing whether South African national policies on refugees and asylum seekers have 
shifted towards or away from human security in the 21 years since attaining democracy. 
● Examining how legislative provisions and national policy are operationalised.  
● Discussing the practical limitations of human security in the South African context.  
1.2. METHOD OF RESEARCH  
This study will employ a qualitative method. It will be analytic and descriptive and will provide 
a historical overview of the applicable South African legislation - the Aliens Control Act (1991), 
the Refugee Act (1998) and the Immigration Act (2002).  I have chosen to use a case study 
because it provides us with “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not yet 
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evident” (Miller and Brewer, 2003: 22). As I want to explore the relationship between human 
security and national policies it is appropriate to use the case study method. I have chosen South 
Africa for a number of reasons -  
● South Africa has increasingly become a popular destination for African migrants 
(Ethiopia houses the most refugees in Africa, however gathering information in respect of 
that country is fairly difficult and its government has been criticised for suppressing 
democratic structures and undermining the rule of law).  
● South Africa transitioned to a democracy from a securocratic state based on the system of 
Apartheid and affirmed its commitment to human security by ratifying various 
international and regional treaties including the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (1951) and by playing a mediatory role in conflicts in Burundi, 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
● South Africa is generally considered to be one of the most democratic countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and its commitment to human security is evident in its constitutional 
principles and its progressive social welfare system.  
I have chosen to examine a 22 year period, from the dawn of constitutional democracy in 1994 
until 2016. Although a lengthy period, it is nonetheless necessary to examine the changing 
outlook towards refugees and asylum seekers in relation to South Africa’s changing socio-
economic position.  
1.3. ORGANISATION OF SECTIONS  
To answer the research question and sub-questions this research essay will be divided into five 
sections -  
Section 1 - will identify the purpose, aims and scope of the study;  
Section 2 - will define human security and locate the concept in the current discourse;  
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Section 3 - will conduct a historical analysis of South African national policies pertaining to 
refugees and asylum seekers and consider these developments within a human security 
framework;  
Section 4 - will explore the practical manifestations of national policy and legislation.  
Section 5 - will provide findings and analysis of the case study  
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2. HUMAN SECURITY  
Human security as a concept has its genesis in the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994. 
The report promised that “human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the 
21st century” (1994:22). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) claimed that 
security has been interpreted narrowly and has exclusively focused on threats to the nation state, 
suggested that a “profound transition” is required in the way that we think about security (HDR, 
1994:22). The HDR suggested that territorial security and the protection of national interests 
have for far too long dominated international discourse and the limited conceptual understanding 
of security has neglected a range of (in)securities that affect the ordinary person (HDR, 1994:22). 
For the ordinary person, security means protection from hunger, unemployment, disease, crime, 
political repression, social conflict and environmental hazards - these being the concerns that 
they agonise about (HDR, 1994:22). The UNDP proposed that the previous narrow notions of 
national security be discarded and to look instead to panoptic human security (HDR, 1994:24).  
 2.1. UNDP DEFINITION OF HUMAN SECURITY  
At the core of human security is the United Nation’s (UN’s) founding credo - freedom from fear 
and freedom from want (HDR, 1994:24). Human security is an offensive concept, which cannot 
be attained through military force. It is an integrative concept, which acknowledges the 
universalism of life claims and is embedded in the notion of solidarity among people (HDR, 
1994:24). The UNDP defines human security as “first, safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and repression and second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (HDR, 
1994:24). Various components contribute to human insecurity and the UNDP has listed seven 
specific categories that threaten human life -  
● Economic Security - include threats of unemployment, job insecurity, insecure working 
conditions and income insecurity;  
  7
 
● Food Security - pertains to the physical and economic access to basic food;  
● Health Security - include threats to health, such as infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV 
and AIDs, diseases or infections related to environmental risks such as air and water 
pollution, and for women, deaths related to childbirth;  
● Environmental Security - include environmental threats such as the degradation of local 
and global ecosystems, water insecurity, deforestation, air pollution, salinization and 
natural disasters;  
● Personal Security - the most vital aspect of human security, these include, threats from 
the state and other states, threats from other groups (ethnic tension), threats from 
individuals or gangs (crime and violence), threats against women, threats against 
children, threats to self (suicide or drug use);  
● Community Security - include threats of ethnic violence;  
● Political Security - pertains to political repression and human rights infringements such as 
threats of systematic torture, ill treatment and disappearance (HDR, 1994:24-33).  
In order to combat the many facets of global insecurity, the UNDP maintains that human security 
must be adopted as a preventative people-centered universal doctrine, which requires the 
attention of the global population because security threats are not isolated and “when the security 
of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved” (HDR, 
1994:23). 
2.2. HUMAN SECURITY IN ACTION  
Japan and Canada, more so than other countries, have been at forefront of the human security 
agenda. Both countries included elements of human security as part of their foreign policy, 
particularly in the realm of development aid (Remacle, 2008: 7-10). Both have been critical to 
the instrumentalisation of human security. Canada took a lead role in the Ottawa Convention on 
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Landmines, the Kimberly Process and the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(Chandler, 2008:433). Japan played a seminal role in establishing the UN Trust Fund for Human 
Security (1999) and the Commission on Human Security (CHS), led by the former UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (Remacle, 2008: 
7-10). The September 11 attacks slighted the prospects for the first CHS report (published a year 
earlier) due to a return of traditional notions of security such as the military interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (the UN’s three step 
approach to humanitarian intervention) represented a global commitment to human security. 
However, as a consequence of the ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Iraq, many UN member states 
objected to the linking of R2P to human security, contending that it encourages militarisation and 
undervalues economic and social needs (Chandler, 2008:430, UNGA/11246, 2012)). The human 
security narrative has permeated all realms of international society. Theoretically it cannot be 
gainsaid that a shift towards human security would be beneficial for the whole world’s citizenry. 
The human security approach has however come short due to limited practical implementation 
and a persistent trend towards militarisation.     
2.3. HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA 
Human security was introduced to international discourse in 1994. However, 3 years earlier the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) met to discuss the possibility of a Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). The resultant Kampala Document 
highlighted four key areas of concern - security, stability, development and cooperation (Africa, 
2015: 179). The security ‘calabash’, like the HDR in 1994, shifted the focus of security from 
military considerations to the individual. The principles of the calabash foreshadowed the 
UNDP’s later understanding of human security that “the security of a nation must be construed in 
terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of 
life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all 
fundamental human rights” (African Leadership Forum, 2011). The CSSDCA was rejected by a 
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number of OAU members but the Kampala document and its notions of human security were 
central to the founding document of the African Union (AU) and the organisation itself.  
Although it does impliedly seek to ensure human security, the Constitutive Act of the AU does 
not make any direct reference to human security. Article 4(h) grants the right to the AU to 
intervene against member states in the case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Unlike other international treaties, the AU does not require the consent of the member 
state making it far easier for it to protect the human security of African people (Tieku, 2007:30). 
The Constitutive Act also provides for a number of human security priorities, such as human 
rights, sustainable development, gender equality, the eradication of preventable diseases and “the 
respect for the sanctity of human life” (AU, 2000). The New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD),  African Peer Review Mechanism and various other AU documents and 
treaties allude to human security. The draft - and final - Non-Aggression and Common Defence 
Pact defines human security as  -  
the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the 
creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the 
survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good 
governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full 
development  (2005:3).    
The Defence Pact also places national and human security on an equal footing and considers 
aggression as hostile acts by any actor “...against the sovereignty, political independence, 
territorial integrity and human security of the population of a State Party to this pact” (2005:3). 
Notably the international definition of human security is substantially narrower than the African 
understanding.  
2.4. OPERATIONALISATION OF AFRICAN HUMAN SECURITY  
The establishment of a Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force evidence a 
practical commitment on the part of the AU towards the attainment of human security. However, 
within individual states operationalisation has faltered, largely because many African 
governments lack the capacity to fulfil human security obligations or corrupt and autocratic 
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leaders have stalled the promotion or adoption of human security mechanisms because that 
would affect their influence and power ((Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru, 2004: 15; Tieku, 
2007:33). African governments have regrettably privileged the protection of “the state, its 
institutions and frontiers, regime stability and military defence” over human security, 
consequently the latter is largely donor-driven except in the case of South Africa (Hussein, 
Gnisci and Wanjiru, 2004: 15). Selfish and inept governance has hindered the application of the 
human security doctrine on a continent plagued by heightened insecurity (Abbas, 2010:364). 
Moreover, the AU has largely failed to fulfil its mandate by allowing tyrannical leaders to remain 
in the Union thus endangering the human security of African people (Tieku, 2007:33) 
2.5. HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Primarily as a result of its own liberation struggle for majority rule, human security has been a 
lodestar of South Africa’s fledgling democracy. In an attempt to overturn the racial inequality, 
economic exclusion and state-sponsored violence of the Apartheid State, the African National 
Congress (ANC) government prioritised the human security agenda and has avidly embraced the 
broadest definition of human security in their domestic and international policy (Ferreira and 
Henk, 2008: 503). Ferreira and Henk (2008:504) postulate that human security perspectives are 
reflected at all levels of South Africa’s state and institutional activities and that “the country’s 
leaders intend that human security be a key end of the synergy gained from the internetworking 
of all societal institutions”. Human and economic development were highlighted as key areas of 
South Africa’s human security strategy.  This found articulation in its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), which included the National Housing Programme, 
Electrification Scheme, an Integrated Nutrition Project and various other initiatives (Africa, 
2015:183). As a consequence of poor economic growth, the RDP was replaced by the 
macroeconomic Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) initiative in 1996, which 
promised to uplift the poor and disenfranchised through economic deregulation and trade 
liberalisation (Ferreira and Henk, 2008: 508). The reality unfortunately was that many 
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developmental programs failed and the GEAR-required privatization of state institutions resulted 
in an increase in unemployment and subsequently an upsurge in crime. Many South Africans 
began complaining that governmental rhetoric did not translate into practicality (Ferreira and 
Henk, 2008: 508).  
But that is perhaps too simplistic an analysis. As evident in its foreign policy, Pretoria’s 
commitment to human security was rather more nuanced. In the post-Apartheid years South 
Africa “joined, re-joined or acceded to some forty-five intergovernmental organisations and 
multilateral treaties” (Cilliers in Ferreira and Henk, 2008: 508). Additionally, South Africa led 
the call for an ‘African renaissance’. This found expression in Pretoria’s diplomatic efforts in the 
AU and its developmental engagement in the South African Development Committee (Africa, 
2015:178). The national government consolidated this pan-Africanist stance by making regional 
peace and human security a focal point of its foreign policy. In 1999 a White Paper entitled South 
African Participation in International Peace Missions was published, which paved the way for 
Pretoria's peace missions in Lesotho, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, 
Sudan and Ethiopia (Ferreira and Henk, 2008: 509). Ferreira and Henk (2008: 509) point out that 
“no other country in Africa had made as explicit a commitment to the ideals of human security as 
South Africa, or committed as high a portion of its resources in the same degree”. Over time, 
however, Pretoria’s human security record has become somewhat more chequered. Positively, the 
RDP encouraged the adoption of a comprehensive social security and welfare system, 
contrastingly under the Zuma administration, the culture of secrecy, bribery, political repression 
and police brutality is evidence of a faltering government and pliable rule of law (Africa, 2015: 
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3. SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL POLICIES  
3.1. THE APARTHEID ERA  
The preservation of a “certain racist society”  formed the keystone for all of Apartheid South 1
Africa’s legislation and its national policies pertaining to migration were no different (Segatti and 
Landau, 2011:35). For the highly paranoid Apartheid government, which was isolated in a region 
with liberation on the horizon, immigration was considered a major national security concern. 
Accordingly, “immigration was about control and deportation not planning and managed 
entry” (Crush, 1998:1). The securitization of South African borders was operationalised by three 
pieces of legislation - the 1950 Population Registration Act, the 1962 Commonwealth Relations 
Act and the 1955 Departure from the Union Regulation Act (Segatti and Landau, 2011:35). It 
was however “Apartheid’s last act”, the 1991 Aliens Control Act that endured as national 
legislation for 12 years after the fall of Apartheid, which had the greatest impact on migration 
(Segatti and Landau, 2011:35). The “draconian apartheid throwback” amalgamated half a 
century of immigration policies into one piece of legislation, and controlled all facets of 
immigration and migration to South Africa (Crush, 1998:18).  
3.2. THE 1991 ALIENS CONTROL ACT  
The Aliens Control Act (ACA) was a product of the fall of the Berlin Wall, F.W. de Klerk’s 
presidency and the influx of Mozambican refugees - who were only allowed refuge in the 
bantustans (Segatti and Landau, 2011:38). It replicated an older piece of legislation, the 1937 
Aliens Act, which sought to curb the inflow of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi occupation in 
Eastern Europe (Segatti and Landau, 2011:38). Both define an alien as “a person who is not 
 A Protestant, White and Afrikaner society (see Segatti and Landau (2011:35-6)). 1
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South African” (RSA, 1991). As a part of Apartheid’s all white strategy, ‘Africans’ were stripped 
of their South African citizenship and the inhabitants of the bantustans - Bophuthatswana, Venda, 
Ciskei and Transkei - were deemed foreigners. The ACA conferred all discretionary power on the 
Minister of Home Affairs, sans judicial review. It stipulated that “no court of law shall have any 
jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, interdict or otherwise interfere with any act, order or 
warrant of the Minister (RSA, 1991). Consistent with other Apartheid legislation, even the most 
basic of human rights (including the provision of refugee status) were lacking. The deportation, 
repatriation and detention of ‘aliens’ was decided at the behest of the Minister and his 
subordinates (Segatti and Landau, 2011:39).  
With a 15 year long civil war (partly a product of its own regional destabilisation efforts) raging 
on South Africa’s border, the Apartheid government was found itself in the throes of a refugee 
crisis. The ACA was employed as the first step in suppressing the flow of Mozambican nationals 
into the country. As a result many of them sought asylum in the bantustans or in the rural border 
areas and the Apartheid government found it increasingly hard to ignore them (Handmaker and 
Schneider, 2002: 2). The refugee crisis forced the pariah state to negotiate with the UNHCR. 
Even though the South African government had previously disregarded the UN and all of its 
organs, those negotiations yielded positive results in the form of a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 1991 - a Basic Agreement which allowed for the establishment of an Office of 
the High Commission in 1993 and a tripartite agreement between the UNHCR, South Africa and 
Mozambique (Dugard, 1992: 522; de la Hunt in Crush, 1998:126). 
Prior to 1993, it is estimated that between 300 000 to half a million Mozambican refugees were 
living in South Africa. Due to their unrecognised status, they were regarded as undocumented 
migrants and were subject to deportation and arrest (de la Hunt in Crush, 1998: 125). The 
tripartite agreement “retroactively recognised” the Mozambican nationals as refugees, but only 
on a group basis (Handmaker and Schneider, 2002: 3). This was because refugee status was a 
requirement for the UNHCR to coordinate a voluntary repatriation programme, in terms of 
approximately 65 000 were thereafter repatriated (Handmaker and Schneider, 2002: 3). With 
more than a hundred thousand Mozambican nationals unwilling to return, the new government 
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had to immediately engage with a refugee crisis. The repatriation programme ended in March 
1995 and in early 1996 President Mandela and his cabinet granted amnesty to approximately 90 
000 people. However, approximately 135 000 Mozambicans remained in South Africa without 
legal status and were subject to deportation (Handmaker and Schneider, 2002:4).  
3.3. NEW REGIME, OLD LAWS  
As democracy dawned and political isolation waned, South Africa became the 53rd member of 
the OAU and a party to various regional treaties including the 1969 OAU Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Protection in Africa (the OAU Convention). South Africa also 
signed and ratified the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Convention) 
and the 1967 Additional Protocol (de la Hunt in Crush, 1998:126). The ratification of these 
international instruments was largely illusory as the ACA was in many respects inconsistent with 
South Africa’s international obligations pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998:4). The UN Convention guarantees that a refugee cannot be penalised for 
entering the receiving country illegally. In direct contradiction the ACA stipulated that a person 
was an alien if s/he entered South Africa at a place other than a port of entry. The lack of 
migratory regulation reform was an indication that a free and democratic society based on a 
commitment to human rights was reserved for South Africans and that foreigners were 
susceptible to human rights infringements (Human Rights Watch, 1998:1).  
For many onlookers and potential asylum seekers the ANC’s ascension to power was expected to 
usher in an open door policy on migration. But, rather unexpectedly, the ANC government 
maintained strict border controls and left the ACA in place until it was repealed and replaced by 
a new immigration act in 2003. In that period, deportation skyrocketed and without 
comprehensive refugee and asylum programmes, successful applicants constituted a small 
minority. In June 1996, of the 16 967 asylum seekers, only 1945 were successful (de la Hunt in 
Crush, 1998:127). Many asylum seekers were denied refugee status as a “matter of course” (de la 
Hunt in Crush, 1998:128). Moreover, the discretionary powers conferred on the Minister and 
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immigration officers made decisions impossible to appeal and the ACA itself was not drafted 
with refugee or asylum seekers in mind (de la Hunt in Crush, 1998:128; Human Rights Watch, 
1998:4). Under the ACA, refugees and asylum seekers were considered “prohibited persons” and 
were treated as undocumented migrants (de la Hunt in Crush, 1998:128). South Africa’s 
unchanged stance attracted criticism. As a Nigerian refugee noted, “when I was young, we 
always talked about our brothers in South Africa and that we wanted them to be free. If a South 
African came to Nigeria, we welcomed him as a brother” (Human Rights Watch, 1998:12). 
Similarly, Chris Landsberg (in Landau and Segatti, 2011:40-1) reminded the government that 
“there is a crucial moral imperative: the republic is riding a wave of moral legitimacy and it must 
navigate responses in line with its global standing; it can ill-afford to turn a blind eye to 
xenophobia and human rights abuses generally”.  
In the 12 year post-Apartheid lifespan of the ACA, only one amendment was effected in 1995, 
which removed sections pertaining to judicial non-interference and the power to detain 
indefinitely. It, nonetheless, still remained inadequate and antiquated in the handling of refugees 
and asylum seekers (de la Hunt, in Crush, 1998:131). These clearly unsatisfactory migratory 
provisions led the Department of Home Affairs (the Department) in conjunction with the 
UNHCR to set up procedures for determining asylum seeker status in South Africa. Those 
included a Director of Refugees Affairs and a Standing Committee for Refugees Affairs, both 
tasked with considering applications for asylum in line with the UN and OAU Conventions (de 
la Hunt, in Crush, 1998:131). Along with the refugee determining bodies, the Department 
established protocols that required asylum seekers to report to immigration officials and be given 
an appointment for asylum review. Afterwards the asylum seeker was furnished with a form 
allowing them to stay in South Africa and seek employment until their application resolved by 
the Standing Committee. If the application was rejected, the asylum seeker was afforded the 
opportunity to appeal within a seven day period (de la Hunt, in Crush, 1998:132-3). The 
establishment of such an administrative system was abstruse and many complaints were lodged 
against the Department for inconsistent decision making. Many asylum seekers also reported 
officials for bribe taking (demanding) and unacceptable behaviour (de la Hunt, in Crush, 
1998:134). The ACA and the additional protocols established by the Department did little to 
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secure the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers and as documented in many instances 
refugees were treated deplorably 
3.4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM  
The much vaunted South African Constitution adopted in 1996, is considered one of the world’s 
most progressive and inclusive governing documents. It, however, makes no explicit provision 
for refugees or asylum seekers, but stipulates that national law must be consistent with 
international law. It contains a Bill of Rights , which is described as “a cornerstone of democracy 2
in South Africa” that “enshrines  the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human rights, dignity, equality and freedom” (RSA, 1996: Chapter 2). The 
inclusion of  “all people in our country” is the clearest indication that the Constitution does not 
discriminate on nationality, and that most of the broad array of rights contained in Chapter 2, 
such as freedom and security, health care, access to information, just administrative action, 
access to courts and rights of the arrested, detained and accused persons (all of particular 
importance to asylum seekers) are rights accorded to “everyone” who find themselves within 
South Africa’s borders not just South African citizens (de la Hunt, in Crush, 1998: 135; RSA, 
1996: Chapter 2). Importantly, section 36 of the Constitution provides that the rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights may only be limited in terms of a law of general application and to the extent 
that such limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom” (RSA, 1996: Chapter 2). Self-evidently non-nationality 
and non-citizenship are not exclusionary categories. Accordingly, the ACA, which enshrined 
national control mechanisms over human dignity, was starkly at odds with a Constitution 
premised on universality, equality and human rights.  
 The achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights are foundational constitutional 2
principles. As such, it may well be unconstitutional for government to explicitly prioritise the provision 
of specific rights and services for nationals over non-nationals or even undocumented persons. 
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Acknowledging the need for reform, a Draft Refugee Bill and a Second Draft Bill was prepared 
by the Department of Home Affairs in 1996. These were accessible to civil society, academic 
institutions, human rights NGOs and a variety of other interested parties, for review and 
workshop. However, following criticism of the proposed second draft, the Department under 
then Minister Buthelezi assembled a task team to address the numerous voids in South Africa’s 
asylum system (Handmaker, 2001: 96; Landau and Segatti, 2011:42). The task team produced a 
Green Paper on International Migration in 1997, which focused on temporary protection, 
regional burden sharing and separate policies for migration and refugees (Handmaker, 2001: 97). 
Following disapproval from civil society,  a Draft Refugee White Paper (1998) was circulated 3
for public review and after many workshops and extensive consultation, a Draft Bill was 
introduced in the National Assembly in September 1998. Following a series of amendments by 
the portfolio committee, President Mandela signed the Refugee Act (No. 130 of 1998) into law in 
December 1998 (Smith, 2003: 34).  
3.4. THE REFUGEE ACT 
The process for the final implementation of a new functional migration regime was long and 
arduous. Although the Refugee Act (RA) was signed into law in 1998, it only came into force 16 
months later in April 2000 (Smith, 2003: 34). It was South Africa’s first piece of legislation that 
recognised the universal right of asylum. It draws on the UN Convention and the OAU 
Convention in defining a refugee in the broadest, internationally compliable terms. According to 
section 3, a person qualifies for refugee status if -   
(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of 
his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of 
that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former 
habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or  
 The process culminating in the Refugee Act of 1998 was opened to response from public and civic 3
society. Many organisations including Human Rights Watch, the Human Rights Commission, the Refugee 
Rights Consortium (a loose affiliation of organisations and individuals), Lawyers for Human Rights and 
Black Sash did do so. See Smith (2003) for a full discussion on the consultation process. 
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(b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; or  
(c) is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b) (RSA, 1998: Section 3).  
As enjoined by the Constitution, section 6 of the RA, which deals with the interpretation, 
application and administration of the Act, requires that due regard be paid to the UN 
Convention, the Additional Protocol, the OAU Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and any other relevant convention or international agreement to which South Africa is or 
becomes party. The RA provides a panoptic understanding of all matters pertaining to refugees, 
including the establishment of administrative organs such as Refugee Reception Offices, a 
Standing Committee and Appeal Board. Section 21 sets out the process to be followed by an 
applicant for asylum.  It is vital for all people who qualify for asylum, because until the asylum 
seeker reports to a Refugee Reception Office and submits an application to the Refugee Status 
Determination Officer and is issued with an Asylum Seeker Permit, (which allows temporary 
sojourn in South Africa whilst the asylum application is pending), the asylum seeker is 
considered an illegal foreigner and is subject to arrest, detention and deportation in accordance 
with the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. Section 26 affords rejected applicants a full right of appeal 
and outlines the appeal process including the option for legal representation. Once the asylum 
seeker has completed all the necessary requirements, s/he is granted refugee status in accordance 
with the RA and is entitled to full legal protection and the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution.  
3.5. IMMIGRATION ACT 
The ACA governed South Africa’s borders until the passage of the Immigration Act (No 13 of 
2002) (IA). The IA was passed after a seven-year consultative process, and was only actually 
finalised in 2005. Segatti (2011:45) describes the policy process as the “most cumbersome 
legislative and policy-making process of the new era of South Africa”. The IA was consistent 
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with the old Apartheid Act and served to securitise national borders and made entry procedures 
more burdensome. The immigration controls contained in the IA attempt to suppress illegal 
immigration and regulate the “influx of foreigners” to promote economic growth (RSA, 2002: 
Section 2-8). Although the IA primarily focuses on illegal foreigners, it directly impacts the 
refugee regime. There is facially and textually a tension between the RA and the IA. The latter 
stipulates that no person may employ, aid, abet, assist, enable or in any manner help an illegal 
foreigner. Importantly, therefore, in terms of the IA an asylum seeker qualifies as an illegal 
foreigner until the attainment of an asylum seeker permit and is subject to apprehension, 
detention and deportation (RSA, 2002: Sections 38-42). The IA represented a setback for refugee 
protection. The outcome being the refugee regime came to be nestled between a want to protect 
fundamental human rights and a perceived need to securitise national borders (Handmaker et. al.,
2008:56). 
It is evident that national policies and legislation did change to reflect the ideals of a democratic 
country. Further, the ratification of international treaties, the adoption of a progressive 
Constitution and the establishment of a more liberal asylum system evidence a commitment to 
the human security model. The RA and the Constitution both serve to fulfil the ‘freedom from 
want and fear’ norm. In particular the Bill of Rights enshrines personal security (s12), food 
security, health security (s27) and commits to providing social security safety nets to the most 
vulnerable (s27). Human dignity for all regardless of citizenship is a founding value of the 
Constitution. However, although South Africa has made significant strides legislatively, the 4
practical reality as I shall endeavour to show, is that all too frequently there is a marked 
disjuncture between those lofty ideals and the adoption and application of policies within that 
legislative framework by Departmental officials. 
 The Constitution entitles everyone without discrimination to the full protection of all rights contained 4
in Chapter 2, with the exception of Political Rights (s19) and Citizenship (s20) which are explicitly 
reserved for citizens. 
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4. LEGISLATIONS VERSUS OPERATIONALISATION  
A small minority of people entering South Africa meet the legal definition of a refugee. Many 
seeking refuge are attracted by South Africa’s commitment to human rights. Although legally 
obligated to ensure the safety and security of refugees and asylum seekers, South Africa has 
encountered a number of challenges and has found it increasingly difficult to meet its legal 
mandate (Landau et.al. 2005:11). A major obstacle to human rights protection has been the 
failure of the Department to effectively operationalise the RA.  
4.1. DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS - FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT  
The Department has continuously demonstrated a failure to adequately operationalise its human 
rights obligations. Segatti states it “lacks the capacity to honor its commitment to refugee 
protection” (in Segatti and Landau, 2011:48). This is evidenced by the largest backlog of pending 
asylum applications globally - 9 000 of 364 638 applications were approved in 2010 and 131 961 
were rejected (in Segatti and Landau, 2011:48). This is the product of “widespread 
administrative irregularities, illegalities, and exploitation. These range from systematic under-
resourcing of government refugee and asylum related activities; poor training and administrative 
integration; unviable or contradictory regulations and outright discrimination” (Landau et.al., 
2005:17-8). The ineptitude of the Department is at the core of human insecurity for many asylum 
seekers. In 2011 the Department began applying the first safe country principle.  The 5
implementation of this principle contravenes provisions of the RA and runs counter to 
international law (Ramjathan-Keogh et.al., 2011). South Africa may also lack procedural 
guarantees in the form of bilateral agreements with those other “safe” countries and the practice 
violates a 2001 court order (Amit, 2011:2). Moreover, the practice flouts the principle of non-
refoulement. All told it exponentially increases the potential for human insecurity.  
 If the route taken between the country of persecution and the country offering protection leads 5
through other countries considered ‘safe’, the asylum seeker can be sent back to the first safe country 
to apply for asylum there. See Ramjathan-Keogh et.al. (2011) for further discussion. 
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The broad range of operational inadequacies constitute a serious impediment to the fulfilment of 
the refugee protection mandate. The national borders are staffed by incompetent officers, most of 
whom lack training. Many of them exploit desperate immigrants for money. Some have also 
been accused of physically abusing and wrongfully detaining immigrants(Amit, 2012:33-4). 
Asylum seekers have reported that many of them did not receive an asylum transit permit and 
many more were not even informed about its existence (Amit, 2012:33-4). Further in breach of 
international law some were turned away at the border even after indicating an intention to apply 
for asylum (Amit, 2012:33-4). This experience is replicated at the Refugee Reception Offices 
(RRO), where corruption appears rampant. Asylum seekers are regularly extorted for money. 
“Refugees”, said one, “are anyone who can pay the officer” (Amit, 2012:56). Due to incapacity 
and large backlogs, the refugee reception centres are unable to provide the necessary services 
thereby placing asylum seekers in danger. As one noted, “this is my third time to be here and I 
can’t afford the transport every time, only to be told to come next Monday. The police don’t 
understand this and they’ll just arrest me. I am afraid” (Amit, 2012:38).  
All asylum seekers entering South Africa are required to report to an RRO for the processing of 
their applications. In accordance with the RA, Refugee Reception Centres were established in 
five of South Africa’s major cities - Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and 
Pretoria. In 2007 South Africa was named as the world’s largest recipient of asylum applicants 
and two more centres were opened (Amit, 2012:16). In 2011, the Department reversed its stance 
and made the alarming decision to close down the Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town 
RROs, forcing asylum seekers to travel much further to alternative centres to submit their 
applications. The closure of RROs, so suggested the Department, was part of its plan to move the 
centres closer to the borders. The original date for construction and opening of centres at the 
border was 2012. That however did not happen. As a result asylum seekers are forced to endure 
unnecessary hardships and refugees, who are required to renew their permits every 2 years, had 
to travel longer distances, restricting where they can live and work and “their ability to fully 
integrate into South African society” (Amit, 2012:7). Subsequently, the Department’s decision to 
close the RROs was subject to a series of court challenges. In finding that the Department’s 
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conduct was unlawful, the Supreme Court of Appeal  (SCA) stated, “the refugees and asylum 6
seekers encountered here are amongst those who are most in need of protection. They do not 
have powerful political constituencies and their problems, more often than not, are ignored by 
government” (Minister of Home Affairs & others v Somali Association of South Africa 2015 (3) 
SA 45 (SCA)).  
Recently, whilst acknowledging his department’s shortcomings and defunct operational 
mechanisms, the Minister of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba, outlined his vision for refugee 
protection in South Africa. This includes a proposed amendment to the Refugee Act (a Draft Bill 
has been gazetted for public comment) and a Green Paper on International Migration, which has 
been published and opened for public comment in June 2016. These represent a significant 
rollback for refugee protection. In terms of the Draft Bill, asylum seekers will face deportation if 
they fail to apply for refugee status within 5 days. Moreover, applications for asylum will be 
assessed on the applicant's ability to sustain him/herself and any dependants (with the assistance 
of family or friends) for a 4 month period (Dludla, 2016). The Green Paper proposes the 
withdrawal of the right to work or study whilst awaiting adjudication and advances plans to 
create Asylum Seeker Processing Centers at the borders where asylum seekers are to be 
accommodated until the determination of their status.  The proposed changes have attracted 7
serious criticism. In a submission to the Department, the Scalabrini Centre (2016)  states, 8
“overall we believe the tenor of the bill is negative and many of the new provisions are overly 
restrictive and in many cases contrary to the Constitution as well as the 1951 Convention relating 
to the status of Refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.” The People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia 
(PCAX) have launched a major campaign  against the Draft Bill becoming law.   
 See Minister of Home Affairs & others v Somali Association of South Africa 2015 (3) SA 45 (SCA) 6
 See Green Paper on International Migration 24 June 2016. 7
A centre that offers development and welfare programmes to the migrant and local communities of 8
Cape Town. 
  23
 
There remains an evident discord between practice and theory. It is clear that whilst current 
national legislation enshrines human security, departmental policies and practices ensure that the 
practical manifestation of this doctrine falls woefully short. The administrative and access issues 
make the operationalisation of the asylum system impossible to attain and has given rise to 
serious human rights violations and resulted in heightened insecurity for asylum seekers and 
refugees. In order for South Africa to meet both its international and domestic obligations to 
refugee protection, these challenges must of necessity be overcome and the human security of 
asylum seekers and refugees must be prioritised. Moreover the more recent trend of a regression 
in human rights protection and a disregard for international law has to be reconsidered if the 
Department is serious about ensuring human security for refugees and asylum seekers. 
4.2. XENOPHOBIA, A BARRIER TO HUMAN SECURITY  
Since 1994 South Africans have become increasingly distressed by the presence of foreigners in 
their country, resulting in rising tide of xenophobia. This disdainful attitude stems from the 
perception that foreigners threaten the rights and interests of citizens (Crush and Williams, 
2005:4). These perceptions have been reinforced by members of the Executive and political elite. 
The then Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi proclaimed, “if we as South Africans 
are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South 
Africa, then we can bid goodbye to our Reconstruction and Development Programme” (IRIN, 
2008). Recently Zulu King Zwelithini said that foreigners “should pack their bags and go” as 
they are taking jobs from citizens (Karimi, 2015). The intolerance of foreigners by all levels of 
society, manifested in waves of xenophobic violence, most significantly in 2008 when 62 people 
were killed, 670 were injured and more than 150 000 displaced, and more recently, the targeted 
attacks, killing and looting of stores of foreign nationals in 2015 (Segatti and Landau, 2011:10; 
Karimi, 2016). 
In the aftermath of the looting of foreign owned shops, South Africa’s Small Business 
Development Minister, Lindiwe Zulu, urged foreign shop owners to share their trade secrets with 
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people in South African townships where they operate to curb violence and looting. She is 
reported to have said, “foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our 
priority is to the people of this country first and foremost. A platform is needed for business 
owners to communicate and share ideas. They cannot barricade themselves in and not share their 
practices with local business owners" (Magubane, 2015). She also said that, “Black people were 
never part of the economy of South Africa in terms of owning anything, therefore when they see 
other people coming from outside being successful they feel like the space is being closed by 
foreigners” (Magubane, 2015). Minister Zulu’s comments are unfortunate and underscore 
government’s mistrust of foreigners. It ignores the fact that many foreigners are not only in the 
country legally, but are conducting legitimate businesses and are a vital part of the economy and 
the communities within which they live. Their continuing to conduct businesses in those 
communities can hardly be conditional on any disclosure of trade secrets - a duty, I daresay, 
which is not imposed on South African shop owners. 
Even though migration to South Africa has steadily risen in the post-Apartheid years, foreign 
nationals number approximately 2.2 million (in 2011),  constituting only 4.2 percent of the entire 9
population (Wilkinson, 2015). The erroneous assumption that South Africa is being “swamped or 
infested with foreigners” and the accompanying xenophobia has hindered efforts towards rights-
based reform of immigration policies (Landau, 2005:16). As such, some South African 
legislation replicates the general anti-foreigner attitude. Whilst the IA explicitly condemns 
xenophobia in its preamble, it does make South African citizens responsible for reporting illegal 
immigrants. Reitzes (2009:13) argues that the executive has acted irresponsibly by taking a 
hardline populist stance on migration which reinforces xenophobic attitudes. She states “calls for 
greater fortification of South Africa breed a siege mentality and exacerbates xenophobia, rather 
than being a solution to the problem”.  
Xenophobia has been a major barrier to the protection of human security for all immigrants but 
most especially refugees and asylum seekers. The discrimination and violence experienced as a 
 According to the last national census in 2011, which is designed to count every person in South Africa, 9
documented and undocumented. Loren Landau and Stats SA in Wilkinson (2015) suggest that the vast 
majority of immigrants would have been recorded. 
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result of xenophobic attacks violated human security norms, specifically personal security and 
community security. The South African government has acted shamefully in not taking decisive 
steps to remedy xenophobic attitudes and has been criticised by a number of human rights 
organisations internationally and domestically for failing to appropriately protect the safety of 
immigrants. The South African Human Rights Commission was one such organisation, stating, 
“If a society’s respect for the basic humanity of its people can best be measured by its treatment 
of the most vulnerable in its midst, then the treatment of suspected illegal immigrants . . . offers a 
disturbing testament to the great distance South African must still travel to build a national 
culture of human rights” (Somali Association of South Africa and others v Limpopo Department 
of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism). 
4.3. ADVANCING  HUMAN SECURITY  
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The South African government has generally been praised for its strides towards refugee 
protection and the adoption of national legislation consistent with its international obligations. 
Contrastingly, and in reality, an uncomfortable truce continues to exist between international 
human rights law and the executive's longing for the maintenance of a sovereign state, as 
evidenced by attempts on the part of the Department “to implement the most regressive parts of 
the act and to amend it to make it more restrictive” (Segatti and Landau, 2011:48). Fortunately, 
human rights groups have admirably sought legal recourse through the courts to overturn any 
prohibitive amendments, such as the creation of refugee camps (Segatti and Landau, 2011:48). 
Civil society  organisations, such as the Lawyers for Human Rights, the Legal Aid Clinics and 10
Human Rights Commission have been at the forefront of advancing refugee protection and have 
attempted to hold government to its international law and Constitutional legal obligations. They 
 Which includes the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), Awethu!, the 10
Wits Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the Nine Plus Unions, Treatment Action Campaign and many 
more NGOs, trade unions and individuals. 
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have thus played a key role in upholding and furthering the human security doctrine in South 
Africa. Smith (2003:29) acknowledges that tension has existed between government and civil 
society right from the beginning - for example, in the drafting phase of the RA, government and 
civil society bodies emphasised different priorities. Government representatives fought for a 
limitation of refugee freedom, whereas civil society bodies advocated a broad based rights 
approach to refugee protection. 
THE ROLE OF THE  JUDICIARY  
The South African judiciary has played a seminal role in the advancement of human security, in 
general and for refugees and asylum seekers. The national judiciary, as constitutionally 
mandated, operates independently from the executive. The judiciary has often enough ruled 
against the government. For instance in the Bulambo Miakimboka Mubake v Minister of Home 
Affairs the court upheld the Constitutional right to a primary education and issued an interim 
order stating that asylum-seekers and refugee children must be permitted to attend public schools 
even without a study permit. The SCA judgment in the case Minister of Home Affairs & Others v 
Watchenuka & Another 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA) is an admirable example of the judiciary’s 
commitment to human security. The court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the Department to 
prohibit work and study for asylum seekers for their first 180 days in the country. The court 
stated “the freedom to engage in productive work - even where that is not required in order to 
survive - is an important component of human dignity, for mankind is pre-eminently a social 
species with an instinct for meaningful association”. Likewise in Somali Association of South 
Africa and others v Limpopo Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism 
and others 2015 (1) SA 151 (SCA), the SCA considered the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers lawfully present in South Africa to earn a living by way of self-employment in the form 
of trading in spaza or tuck shops. The court, whilst decrying what can only be described as a 
hardened bureaucratic perspective held: ‘to sum up, there is no blanket prohibition against 
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asylum seekers and refugees seeking employment. There appears to be no restrictive legislation 
or conditions in place that we could discern that prohibit foreign nationals from being granted 
spaza or tuck-shop licences”. In both of these cases the court acknowledged that if asylum 
seekers and refugees were restricted in their employment as the Department sought to do and 
unable to earn a living, this would substantially impact on their ability to live a dignified life that 
is guaranteed by the Constitution and would accordingly exacerbate the economic, physical and 
food insecurities of an already vulnerable group.  
These and other cases represent a clear commitment by South African courts to human rights, 
refugee protection and human security. Thus absent proper mechanisms to uphold international, 
regional and even national obligations, it has generally fallen to civil society organisations and 
the judiciary to fill an important void in the human security regime.   
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5. CONCLUSION  
The establishment of an asylum system was of particular importance to the national government, 
consisting of many who themselves sought asylum in neighbouring countries and further afield, 
whilst fleeing persecution from the Apartheid State. The adoption of the RA represented a 
seismic shift away from the previous archaic legislative regime and its unconstitutional 
mechanisms of border control. That however, is not to suggest that all obstacles that hitherto 
stood in the way of asylum seekers have been eliminated by the passage of that legislation. The 
IA falls to be read in conjunction with the RA and although primarily concerned with controlling 
illegal movement, is in many respects antithetical to South Africa’s international law obligations. 
For, the application of the IA means in effect that refugee and asylum seeker rights must often, of 
necessity, yield to the securitization of South Africa’s porous borders. The inconsistency in 
migratory legislation does not detract from the strides made towards ensuring human security for 
refugees and asylum seekers in national policy. Yet, all of the changes in national legislation can 
only be rendered meaningful through proper operationalisation because not being able to realise 
guaranteed rights is tantamount to the denial of those rights.  
The South African government has been confronted with various challenges, including 
inadequacies in infrastructure, untrained staffers and rampant corruption. Much it must be said of 
its own making and in practice it has found it increasingly difficult to fulfil its legal mandate. 
Furthermore, due to infrastructural deficiencies basic tenets of international law were flouted, 
including that most important universally held principle of non-refoulement. Unbridled 
xenophobia proliferated at all levels of society, spurring attacks around the country. The 
profound intolerance of the foreigner made human security even less attainable as refugees and 
asylum seekers found themselves directly in harm's way. Moreover, the Department’s proposed 
reforms indicate a worrying shift away from human security and refugee protection, towards the 
securitisation of national borders and more stringent immigration controls. Fortunately, there is a 
silver lining - principally through civil society initiatives and the judiciary, human security for 
refugee and asylum seekers has gained significant traction. But it is ultimately to the South 
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African government, principally in the form of the Executive, that one must look for a 
vindication of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. After all, it is to them that we look for 
the operationalisation of human security values and in that respect they have come up 
astoundingly short, prompting Amit to observe, “A system that fails to protect those most in need 
of refuge cannot be characterised as an adequate refugee protection framework. By failing to 
fulfil its core protective purpose, South Africa’s refugee system has become superfluous” (Amit, 
2011a:488). Thus, whilst South Africa’s commitment, on paper at least, to human rights and 
human security resonates with the animating principles enshrined in an array of international 
instruments, for many of the most vulnerable who find themselves within her borders it matters 
not. 
One does have to realise that the greatest barrier to the realisation of human security for refugees 
and asylum seekers is far more nuanced than the defunct operationalisation of legislation. Rather, 
it is indicative of wider systemic problems. The South African government has not only failed to 
ensure human security for the most vulnerable but has failed to provide for the majority of South 
Africans. Economic inequalities continue to permeate South African society – dividing it into the 
haves and haves-not. Communities have vastly different living conditions including access to 
health care, education, housing and personal security. The changes since 1994 have not entirely 
eliminated those divisions. Refugees are usually cast adrift with little to no resources in informal 
communities characterised by poor infrastructure and high levels of unemployment and violence. 
The pre-dominate worldview usually determines whose voices are heard and what socio-
economic problems receive priority. These articulations of intersectional power not only shape 
how South African citizens engage with refugees and asylum seekers but also what policy 
choices are made. The plight of refugees thus cannot be addressed in isolation. Existing 
hierarchies and power matrices must be challenged to ensure the meaningful social and 
economic integration of refugees into South African society. This requires an appreciation that 
the different policy responses for refugees as compared to citizens that has hitherto informed our 
thinking is short sighted. But that is a formidable challenge both at a policy and operational level 
and would demand a new found sophistication from those who control the levers of power.  
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